Educational Systems, Intergenerational Mobility and Social Segmentation

We show that the very characteristics of educational systems generate social segmentation. A stylised educational framework is constructed in which everyone receives a compulsory basic education and can subsequently choose between direct working, vocational studies and university. There is a selection for entering the university which consists of a minimum human capital level at the end of basic education. In the model, an individual's human capital depends (i) on her/his parents' human capital, (ii) on her/his schooling time, and (iii) on public expenditure for education. There are three education functions corresponding to each type of study (basic, vocational, university). Divergences in total educational expenditure, in its distribution between the three studies and in the selection severity, combined with the initial distribution of human capital across individuals, can result in very different social segmentations and generate under education traps (situations in which certain dynasties remain unskilled from generation to generation) at the steady state. We finally implement a series of simulations that illustrate these findings in the cases of egalitarian and elitist educational systems. Assuming the same initial distribution of human capital between individuals, we find that the first system results in two-segment stratification, quasi income equality and no under education trap whereas the elitist system generates three segments, significant inequality and a large under education trapEducational systems; intergenerational mobility; social segmentation; under-education trap

Growing Income Inequalities in Advanced

In this paper, we survey the literature that studies the issue of growing inequalities in advanced countries (the North). We firstly unveil the main facts concerning widening inequality in the North and we underlie the differences between countries and groups of countries. We put forward the concomitance of the rise in inequality with three key developments that are the three major explanations given to growing inequality : globalization, skill biased technological progress and institutional changes. We finally expose the mechanisms behind each explanation and examine the results of the empirical works that attempt to appraise their respective impacts. The overall diagnosis is that the three explanations are valid but (i) their weight may substantially differ across countries and sectors, and (ii) they interact in the determination of inequality

Inequality in Emerging Countries

We review the theoretical and empirical economic literature upon income inequality in emerging countries. We firstly describe the main observed de velopments and show that these are rather diverse across countries and developing regions. We subsequently expose the main theoretical mechanisms. We make a distinction between the traditional approaches (Kuznets, Lewis, Stolper-Samuelson) and the new explanations. In the latter, globalization and globalization-driven technological changes are at the core of the analyses. Both approaches bring out several opposite mechanisms. Finally, the empirical estimates display rather conflicting results. Most cross-country studies find a weak impact of globalization on income inequality. In contrast, several longitudinal studies concerning countries taken separately or small groups of countries reveal a positive correlation between openness and the relative demand for skill and inequality. These apparently conflicting findings reflect the opposite mechanisms linked to globalisation and the differences in countries' experiences

Offshoring and labour market reforms : modelling the German experience

A usual interpretation of the high performance of the German economy since 2005 is that the Hartz labour market reforms have boosted German competitiveness, resulting in higher exports, higher production and lower unemployment. This explanation is at odds with the sequence of observed facts. We propose and model an alternative scenario in which offshoring explains the gains in competitiveness but increases unemployment and inequality, and the subsequent labour market reforms lower unemployment by lessening the reservation wage and expanding the non-tradable sector. The model replicates the developments of the German economy since 1995: 1) Germany offshores more intensively than other advanced countries; 2) The increase in competitiveness and in the exports/production ratio occurs before the implementation of the labour market reform, and this comes with both higher inequality and higher unemployment; 3) The implementation of the reform reduces unemployment, but also decreases the exports/production ratio and increases inequality. The model also predicts that the reduction in unemployment in Germany would have occurred without the Hartz reforms, but later and less intensively. We finally discuss the possible extension of this strategy to other Eurozone countries, and alternative policies that activate similar mechanisms without increasing inequality

Le Nord-Pas-de-Calais, entre mutations éconmiques et développement humain

La région Nord-Pas-de-Calais connaît depuis plusieurs décennies une transformation de son tissu productif qui pose la question de l’arbitrage entre mutation économique et progrès social: là où les difficultés économiques ont été les plus marquées, des territoires ont pu connaître un réel décrochage, avec de moindres perspectives de progrès social. Cette problématique est accentuée depuis 2008, avec une crise qui a des conséquences importantes sur les territoires

Education, Intergenerational Mobility and Inequality

We review the economic literature on the impacts of the several dimensions of education upon intergenerational inequality persistency. It is firstly outlined that the critical increase in the population education level in all countries has not come with lower inequality. The basic tools of education and intergenerational mobility modelling are subsequently exposed (OLG, education functions, education decision making etc.). The following two theoretical sections analyse the cases in which education leads (i) to human capital convergence in the long term and (ii) to social stratification with the emerging of under-education traps (situations in which certain dynasties remain continuously under-educated). A simple modelling of both cases is proposed for two types of educational decisions, one based on the family expenditure on education and the other on the time spent for education. The factors that generate social stratification and under education traps are especially underlined. The empirical literature on the determinants of educational attainment and intergenerational mobility is finally reviewed. This reveals the crucial impact of family backgrounds on educational attainment in all countries. It also demonstrates huge and last ing differences across countries in terms of intergenerational mobility

Educational Systems, Intergenerational Mobility and Social Segmentation

We show that the very characteristics of educational systems generate social segmentation. A stylised educational framework is constructed in which everyone receives a compulsory basic education and can subsequently choose between direct working, vocational studies and university. There is a selection for entering the university which consists of a minimum human capital level at the end of basic education. In the model, an individual's human capital depends (i) on her/his parents' human capital, (ii) on her/his schooling time, and (iii) on public expenditure for education. There are three education functions corresponding to each type of study (basic, vocational, university). Divergences in total educational expenditure, in its distribution between the three studies and in the selection severity, combined with the initial distribution of human capital across individuals, can result in very different social segmentations and generate under education traps (situations in which certain dynasties remain unskilled from generation to generation) at the steady state. We finally implement a series of simulations that illustrate these findings in the cases of egalitarian and elitist educational systems. Assuming the same initial distribution of human capital between individuals, we find that the first system results in two-segment stratification, quasi income equality and no under education trap whereas the elitist system generates three segments, significant inequality and a large under education tra

Pour une meilleure répartition du financement du système éducatif

Collection Chaire Transitions démographiques et Transitions économiques.International audienc

Is the German experience applicable to France?

International audienc